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DUALISM AND MATERIALISM: 
ATHENS AND JERUSALEM? 
Peter van Inwagen 
The thesis that dualism is a Greek import into Christianity and that the 
Christian hope of eternal life does not presuppose dualism has recently 
begun to win adherents. This paper is a defense of this thesis. One philo-
sophical argument for dualism (that dualism best explains the phenomenon 
of sensuous experience) is briefly discussed and is rejected. The body of the 
paper addresses the relevant creedal and biblical data. The paper closes 
with a discussion of the question whether the doctrine of the Resurrection 
of the Dead, on which the Christian hope of eternal life is founded, presup-
poses dualism. 
Most Christians seem to have a picture of the afterlife that can without too 
much unfairness be described as "Platonic." When one dies, one's body 
decays, and what one is, what one has been all along, an immaterial soul or 
mind or self, continues to exist. One then faces judgment and is "sent" to 
heaven or to hell. Christians who are particularly well-instructed (by cur-
rent standards), will know that they are supposed to believe in something 
that doesn't fit this picture too well, something called the Resurrection of 
the Dead; if pressed, they will perhaps say that the burden of the doctrine 
of the Resurrection of the Dead is that eventually God will give everyone a 
body again-one of those mysterious and apparently pointless procedures 
for which God no doubt has some good reason that He has mercifully cho-
sen not to bother us with (like Confirmation). 
This picture of the afterlife obviously presupposes Platonic or Cartesian 
dualism. I want to explain why I find this doctrine unsatisfactory, both as a 
Christian and as a philosopher. (But, as my title no doubt suggests, I'm 
going to have more to say about my religious difficulties with dualism. 
And my discussion of religious difficulties with dualism will be centered 
on the afterlife.) 
I shall begin by discussing in a very brief, partial, and sketchy way, 
some of my philosophical difficulties with "Platonic or Cartesian" dualism. 
Many philosophers of mind today would classify the dualism of Plato and 
Descartes as "substance dualism," a term that lives by its contrast to "prop-
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erty dualism." And property dualism is supposed to be the thesis that, 
although human beings are (or may be) physical or material objects of 
some sort, they have properties, their mental properties, that are non-physi-
cal. But what is a "non-physical property"? The obvious definition would 
be this: a property is non-physical if it entails the property of not being 
physical, if it is a property that cannot be had by anything physical. But it 
would follow from this definition that, if mental properties are non-physi-
cal properties, then anything that has mental properties is a non-physical 
thing; the obvious definition, therefore, does not capture whatever it is that 
property dualists mean by 'non-physical property'. While there is a good 
deal more to be said about this issue, I record my conviction that there is 
no way to make sense of 'non-physical property' and hence no way to 
make sense of property dualism. When I talk of dualism, therefore, I mean 
substance dualism: the thesis that there are both physical and non-physical 
substances, that you and I are and all other human persons are non-physi-
cal substances, and that each human person bears some sort of intimate 
relation to a certain living human organism, the person's body. 
In my book Metaphysics, I presented some arguments against dualism 
that seemed pretty good to me. Oddly enough, few dualists were persuad-
ed by them. I am, for the most part, not going to repeat these arguments 
here. I will say only that when I enter most deeply into that which I call 
myself, I seem to discover that I am a living animal. And, therefore, dualism 
seems to me to be an unnecessarily complicated theory about my nature-
unless there is some fact or phenomenon or aspect of the world that dual-
ism deals with better than materialism does (or, equivalently, I should 
think, unless there is some good argument for dualism). 
If there is any argument that shows that Platonic or Cartesian dualism is 
not an unnecessarily complicated view of our nature, it will presumably 
take the form of a demonstration that you and I have properties that are 
not (or could not reasonably be supposed to be) properties of any material 
object. Is there any such argument? Are there any such properties? 
I will consider only one such property or set of properties: those associ-
ated with what Leibniz calls perception--or, let us say, sensuous experi-
ence; experiencing a particular shade of red or the taste of Vegemite or the 
sensation of toothache. I believe that Leibniz has shown-in his famous 
thought-experiment in the Monadology--that it is very hard indeed to see 
how a material thing could have "sensuous properties" like being in pain 
or "sensing redly." I should, in fact, be willing to make a statement that 
most of my fellow materialists will regard as treasonous: Leibniz's 
thought-experiment shows that when we carefully examine the idea of a 
material thing having sensuous properties, it seems to be an impossible 
idea. If I am right about these things, do they provide me with a good rea-
son for being a dualist? No-for the following argument-schema is invalid: 
DorM 
Q 
It is very hard to see how it could be that Q if M 
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hence, 
That Q is a good reason for believing that D. 
Here is a counterexample. Suppose we know that Bill is either the Pope 
or the Patriarch of Constantinople, but we don't know which. And sup-
pose we know that (for reasons that are hidden from us) he attends ser-
vices at a Christian Reformed church every Sunday. It would be a mistake 
for us to reason as follows: 
Bill is either the Pope or the Patriarch of Constantinople 
Bill attends services at a Christian Reformed church every Sunday 
It is very hard to see how it could be that Bill attends services at a 
Christian Reformed church every Sunday if he is the Patriarch of 
Constantinople. 
hence, 
That Bill attends services at a Christian Reformed church every 
Sunday is a good reason for believing that he is the Pope. 
It may be that there is a valid argument-schema in, so to speak, the gen-
eral vicinity of this invalid argument-schema. The schema that is got by 
replacing the third premise-schema with 
It is significantly easier to see how it could be that Q if D than it is 
to see how it could be that Q if M 
seems quite plausible. But the following instance of this schema is, I think, 
false: 
It is significantly easier to see how it could be that we have sensu-
ous experience if we are immaterial things than it is to see how it 
could be that we have sensuous experience if we are material 
things. 
Any inclination that anyone may have to believe that this statement is true 
is, in my view, an illusion that is due to the fact that it is much harder for us 
to represent immaterial things in our thought than material things; for that 
reason, it is much harder to carry out the analogue of Leibniz's thought-
experiment for immaterial things. But, if one perseveres through this diffi-
culty-or so it has seemed to me when I have tried it-one will find that it is 
just as difficult to imagine an immaterial thing having sensuous experiences 
as it is to imagine a material thing having sensuous experiences (more diffi-
cult, in fact; but only because it is not very easy to imagine an immaterial 
thing at all). The hard fact of the matter is, sensuous experience is a great 
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philosophical mystery. Like the passage of time and self-reference and 
vagueness, it's just something we don't have a very good philosophical 
handle on. It is a mystery how a material thing could have sensuous prop-
erties simply and solely because it is a mystery how anything could. 
II 
Let us now turn from philosophical to theological considerations. What 
can be said about the question whether the Christian (qua Christian) is in 
any sense committed to dualism? The relevant considerations would seem 
to be what is found in the following texts, which I list in order of ascending 
importance: 
the writings of venerable but non-authoritative authors (par-
ticularly the Fathers of the Church); 
the three great first-millennial creeds; 
Holy Scripture. 
Let us take these in turn. 
When we consider the Fathers, it is incontestable that dualism triumphs. 
Almost without exception, the Fathers were dualists. I am not happy about 
setting myself against such a cloud of witnesses. Nevertheless, I believe 
that the anthropology of the Fathers is the result of an unfortunate mar-
riage of Athens and Jerusalem, and, although I follow the Fathers on most 
matters about which they mostly agree, I am not going to follow them on 
this one. 
I pass with relief to the Creeds. Here there is no trace of the "Platonic" 
picture of the afterlife. For the record, here is what the Apostles' Creed, the 
Nicene Creed, and the Athanasian Creed have to say about our post-
mortem existence: 
I believe in ... the resurrection of the body and the life everlast-
ing. 
I look for the resurrection of the dead, and the life of the world 
to come. 
At whose [Christ's] coming all men shall rise again with their 
bodies and shall give account for their own works. And they 
that have done good shall go into life everlasting; and they 
that have done evil into everlasting fire. 
What is most worthy of note about these passages for our purposes is what 
they do not say. What they do not say is that in the interval between a per-
son's death and resurrection, a person eXIsts as a separated soul. Indeed, 
they have nothing whatever to say about that interval. The friends of dual-
ism may answer that nothing in the creeds implies that we shall not exist as 
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separated souls between our death and the general resurrection. I agree. It 
is a quite plausible thesis that everyone responsible for the wording of the 
two later creeds was a dualist, and that nothing about the state of the soul 
between death and resurrection was put into those two creeds because 
every Christian in the fourth and fifth centuries-Catholic, heretic, or schis-
matic-was a dualist. (Thou hast conquered, Athenian!) I contend only 
that there is nothing in the passages I have quoted to make the anti-dualist 
uncomfortable.' 
Let us now turn to the Bible. I shall look first at the Old Testament and 
then at the New. 
There is little to support dualism in the Old Testament, and much that 
the materialist will find congenial. God, we are told, 
.. .formed man [adham] of dust from the ground [adhamah], and 
then breathed into his nostrils the breath of life, and man became a 
living being. [Gen 2:7] 
Later, when God's curse is pronounced upon adham and adhamah, God 
says, 
In the sweat of your face you shall eat bread till you return to the 
ground, for out of it you were taken; you are dust, and to dust you 
shall return. [Gen 3:19] 
This Ash Wednesday theme, so to call it, the theme of humanity as dust, is, 
of course, a common one in the Old Testament: " ... shall the dust praise 
thee?"; " ... they that go down into the dust .... " The attempts I know of to 
give a Platonic gloss to this theme seem to me to be singularly unconvinc-
ing. Consider, for example, Longfellow's verse (and I don't think that any 
major philosopher or theologian has done a better job of Platonizing the 
dust of Genesis than the minor poet has): 
Life is real and life is earnest 
And the grave is not its goal. 
"Dust thou art, to dust returnest" 
Was not spoken of the soul. 
Indeed it wasn't. But it was spoken of the living human beings Adam 
and Eve. 
Dust is still present in the first biblical intimation of resurrection (I 
would not count Ezekiel's vision of the Valley of the Dry Bones as an inti-
mation of resurrection), in Daniel 12:2: 
And many of them that sleep in the dust of the earth shall 
awake, some to everlasting life, and some to shame and everlast-
ing contempt. 
I suppose I should say something about Saul and the Witch of Endor 
and the summoning of Samuel from the dead. But I really don't know 
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what to say about this story. When I read it, I have only questions. Does 
the Christian dualist think that this story supports dualism? Can the 
Christian who believes that we exist in a disembodied state after death 
believe that there are necromancers, people who have the power to sum-
mon the disembodied dead and cause them somehow to assume a visible 
form? Is this not a difficult story for all Christians who take the Bible seri-
ously? I'd like to hear what some others think about this story. 
TIl 
Let us now turn to the New Testament. I shall discuss both what I con-
sider to be the general tendency of the New Testament and two passages 
that are sometime used as "proof texts" by dualists. 
The New Testament is not a textbook of metaphysics. Nevertheless, the 
books of the New Testament-unlike the books of the Old-were com-
posed in a world in which metaphysics was very much in the air, and there 
are passages that reflect this. It was the Greek proclivity to metaphysical 
speculation, I suppose, that was responsible for the celebrated and difficult 
passage in I Corinthians on, as we might say, the specifics of the 
Resurrection of the Dead. "But someone will ask, 'How are the dead 
raised? With what kind of body do they come?' You foolish man!" Paul's 
exasperation is evident, but he does not shirk the question, and, it seems to 
me, his answer provides the single passage in the New Testament that is 
directly addressed to philosophical worries about resurrection. Let us look 
at what Paul says, and let us not be bound by the conventions of New 
Testament translation, which make use of terms that are for us associated 
with all sorts of ideas that were not present in Paul's mind-or at least I 
should like to see some argument before I granted that they were: 
What you sow will not be made alive unless it die, and what you 
sow is not the soma that will be, but a naked kernel [k6kkos], as it 
may be of wheat or of some other kind; but God gives it a soma as he 
wished, to each seed [sprrma] its own soma. Not a1l flesh is the same, 
for human beings have one flesh, and beasts another flesh, and 
birds another, and fish another still ... So also the resurrection of the 
dead. What is sown is sown in corruption and raised in incorrup-
tion; it is sown in dishonor, it is raised in glory; it is sown in weak-
ness, it is raised in power; it is sown a psychic soma, it is raised a 
pneumatic soma. If there is a psychic soma, there is also a pneumatic 
soma. So also it is written: the first human being Adam became a liv-
ing psuche. The final Adam became a W'e-giving pneuma. [15:36-45] 
What is the "naked kernel" of which Paul speaks? The Christian Platonist 
will reply, "the soul, of course." But we should note that Paul does not 
think that the kernel of wheat that is planted in the ground is an immateri-
al psuche. Indeed, Paul applies this word-and the corresponding adjective, 
which I have somewhat perversely represented by the English word 'psy-
chic',-only to that which is sown and dies, not to that which is raised. I do 
not think it strains the text to say that Paul used the word 'psuehe' to mean 
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'a human being alive with old life that comes to us from Adam'. (If Paul 
had wanted to talk of the "soul" in anything like the Platonic sense, we 
may wonder why he would use the only word available for expressing 
that sense with an entirely different meaning.) I would contend, similarly, 
that Paul used the adjective I have represented by the word 'psychic' to 
mean 'alive with the old Adamic life', and that he used the word 'pneuma' 
("spirit") to mean 'a human being who is alive with the new resurrection 
life' (and so, similarly, for the adjective I have represented by the word 
'pneumatic'). 
A note on the word 'soma'. I have no real objection to translating 'soma' 
as 'body', so long as we do not understand the English word in what I may 
call its "strict, Cartesian sense." An example will illustrate what T mean. A 
present-day analytical philosopher, writing about the implications of keep-
ing Alice's brain alive in a vat, may well speak of Alice, during her brain's 
time in the vat, as "not having a body," and may well go on to discuss the 
consequences of inserting her brain "into a new body." But a Cartesian will 
tell this philosopher that, strictly speaking, the brain in the vat is Alice's 
body, and that the projected surgery, strictly speaking, will not supply Alice 
with a body but will rather transform the rather minimal body she has in 
the vat into a body of normal size, shape, and capacities. (And one would 
not have to be a Cartesian to agree that, strictly speaking, this is how we 
should talk. Even the materialist may agree on reflection that this is how 
we should use the word 'body' if we are being careful.) Now suppose we 
convince a Cartesian that my interpretation of Paul is correct: that the 
"naked kernel" that is sown when Priscilla dies is not something immateri-
al but something that stands to the raised Priscilla as the seed stands to the 
new wheat. This Cartesian will say that if Paul is right, then Priscilla will 
never, even in death, lack a body-not strictly speaking. Rather, between 
her death and her resurrection, she will have a naked kernel (whatever 
exactly that may turn out to be) for a body. But this "strict, Cartesian" use 
of 'body', however defensible it may be on abstract, philosophical grounds, 
is not the same as Paul's use of 'soma'. Paul's use of 'soma' is much more 
like that of my analytical philosopher who writes about a brain's "getting a 
new body." For Paul, the soma-that-will-be is the living flesh with which 
God will cloth the naked kernel, as He clothed the dry bones in Ezekiel's 
vision-but flesh that is alive with the new life that He has given to us in 
Christ, and not with the old life that He breathed into the dust of which 
Adam was made.2 In a sense, then, flesh and blood will inherit the 
Kingdom of God. But not this flesh and not this blood, which are perish-
able, but the imperishable flesh and blood that God will give us when we 
come to the wedding feast. (Some of us, having refused the new life, will 
have nothing to put on but flesh that is alive with the old life, but God will 
give everyone one flesh or the other.)' 
I do not have the space, or the learning, to consider everything Paul says 
about resurrection. T do, however, have a question for the Christian dualist 
about the Pauline representation of death and resurrection. If, between 
one's death and one's resurrection, one exists as a disembodied Platonic 
soul, why does Paul repeatedly refer to death as a sleep? I by no means 
contend that the Christian dualist cannot come up with a satisfactory 
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answer to this question, but I do think that the dualist's answer, or 
answers, should be explicitly set out for examination. 
I wish now to look at several passages (passages I regard as typical-I 
am still on the topic of general tendencies in the New Testament) in which 
Jesus is represented as using the word ·psuche'. Again, I will lay aside the 
conventions of New Testament translation. 
For whoever wishes to save his psuche will lose it, but whoever 
loses his psuche for my sake shall find it. For what will someone be 
profited if he gains the whole world and forfeits his pf'ucile? Or 
what will anyone give in exchange for his psuche? [Matt 16: 25, 26. 
Cf Mark 8:36, 37.4] 
(One of the conventions of New Testament translation is to translate the 
first two occurrences of psuche in this passage as 'life' and the second two 
as'soul'.) 
Anyone who does not take his cross and follow me is not worthy 
of me. Whoever has found his psuche shall lose it, and whoever has 
lost his psuche for my sake shall find it. [Matt 10:38, 39. Cf Mark 8: 
35; Luke 17:33] 
It seems to me obvious that in these passages, 'psuche' should be translated 
simplyas'life'. 
There is a passage (also in Matthew) that uses the word 'psuche' in a way 
that suggests a Platonic view of the afterlife; although I speak under correc-
tion, I believe that it is the only passage in the New Testament of which 
this can be said: 
Do not fear those who can kill the soma but not the PSUclle; fear 
rather him who is able to destroy both the pSUcl/(i and the soma in 
Gehenna. [10:28] 
This is what some would call "Q" material; it is worth looking at the corre-
sponding passage in Luke: 
... do not fear those who kill the soma and after that have nothing 
more that thev can do; fear him who after he has killed has author-
ity to cast intC; Gehenna. [12: 4,5] 
I regard the Lucan passage as representing more accurately the dominical 
saying that underlies both passages. I would suggest that Luke's wording 
reflects an understanding of what is suggested by the Greek opposition of 
'psllche' and 'soma' that is superior to that of the author of Matthew. 
(Perhaps Luke cannot think of a good word to use as the direct object of 
'cast', and for that reason uses the verb intransitively.) 
T now tum now from the general to the particular, to the two "proof 
texts" I have promised to discuss. (By a 'proof text' I mean a biblical pas-
sage that is regarded by someone or other as a "clincher," a passage that 
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simply settles some theological question. Various people with whom I have 
discussed the Christian view of the afterlife have cited these two passages 
to demonstrate that the Bible teaches that the unresurrected dead think 
and speak and are aware. And, they argue, if the unresurrected dead think 
and speak and are aware, that implies dualism.) Both of the passages are 
from Luke (they have no parallels in the other Gospels), and both turn on 
dominical utterances. 
The first is the parable of Dives and Lazarus (Luke 16: 19-31). The argu-
ment for the conclusion that this parable represents the unresurrected dead 
as conscious and capable of thought and action is this. The rich man in Hell 
(hades) and Abraham converse in the present tense (across a "great gulf") 
about the rich man's still-living brothers; the rich man begs Abraham to 
send a messenger to them to warn them of what is in store for them if they 
do not alter their lives. Abraham tells him that this would do no good, but 
he does not dispute the rich man's assumption that, at the very moment 
they are speaking, his brothers are alive and sinning away. 
Let us first note that this is a parable. I believe that the way to approach 
a parable is to ask what its central lesson is, and to draw from the parable 
no conclusions that are not closelv related to that central lesson. We should 
not, for example, conclude from" the parable of the thief in the night that 
God is liable to make off with our property when we least expect it, or 
from the parable of the unjust judge that the purpose of prayer is to annoy 
God till, just to shut us up, He tends to our needs. Here is a more substan-
tive example. I would not draw from the parable of Dives and Lazarus the 
conclusion that the damned can desire the salvation of others (a conclusion 
that is not, I suppose, heretical, but is not what Christians have generally 
believed, either). I would not draw this conclusion because I do not think 
that the parable is addressed to the question whether the damned can have 
altruistic concerns. The central lesson of the parable (or rather the central 
lesson of the part of it I have summarized; the parable is complex, and 
makes several points) is that supernatural manifestations have no power to 
produce real changes in the lives of the wicked, of those who flout Moses 
and the prophets without the smallest pang of compunction. Jesus' resur-
rection itself-an allusion to that event is pretty clearly intended-will not, 
considered simply as a display of God's power, convert anyone who does 
not recognize the claims of the Law. I do not think that this parable licenses 
any theological conclusions that are not closely related to this lesson. And, 
I would argue, questions about the metaphysics of the afterlife are not 
closely-or even distantly-related to this lesson. (I want to stress the point 
that I am speaking only about how I think we should approach parables, 
pithy little stories told by a character in the biblical narrative to illustrate or 
illumine an abstract point by means of concrete imagery, stories told as rec-
ognized fiction; what I say is not addressed to any more general hermeneu-
tical question.) 
If you disagree, let me ask you a question. Suppose, safe on Canaan's 
side, you were to discover that you had been, well, just dead for a thousand 
years. Would you ask Jesus how he could have so misled you, in the para-
ble of Dives and Lazarus, about the possibility of communication between 
the living and the recently dead? 
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The second text we shall consider is the story of the Good Thief (Luke 
23: 42,43). The argument for the conclusion that the unresurrected dead 
are aware of their condition is, of course, an obvious inference from Jesus' 
words, "Truly I tell you, today you shall be with me in Paradise."" 
This utterance of Jesus does not occur in a parable, and what I have said 
in response to the previous "proof text" does not, therefore, apply to it. 
Neither, however, does it occur within a discourse on the nature of the 
afterlife. The words of Jesus are, obviously, supposed to be what The Book 
of Common Prayer calls "comfortable words." Let me ask a question in 
somewhat the same spirit as the question I asked a moment ago. Imagine 
that the Good Thief dies in agony; "the next thing he knows," as the idiom 
has it, he is in Paradise. He presently discovers that over three thousand 
years have passed since he died. Was he deceived? Was it somehow wrong 
of Jesus to say to him, "Today you shall be with me in Paradise"? If so, 
what should Jesus have said? Should he have said, "After the general res-
urrection, which will occur after an indefinite period that only the Father 
knows, you shall be with me in ParadisE~but it will seem to you as if no 
time has passed"? Are there not circumstances in which taking extreme 
care to frame one's statements in words that express only the strict and lit-
eral truth is unsatisfactory from a pastoral point of view? And are there 
not, in fact, circumstances in which taking extreme care to frame one's 
statements in words that express only the strict and literal truth can 
impede communication? (I know that a certain large structure in 
Manhattan is a terminal and not a station; nevertheless, I don't generally 
call it Grand Central Terminal, because that's not what most people call it. 
And from my calling it Grand Central Station you cannot infer that I 
believe that it's a station rather than a terminal.) In any case, to suppose 
that Jesus and the Good Thief would have attached much importance to 
the distinction between the strict and the lax interpretations of Jesus' 
words-the strict being the one insisted on by those who are treating these 
words as proof text, and the lax being the one I'm pushing-seems to me 
to attribute an analytical cast of mind to two first-century Jews (in their 
extreme agony, let us remember) that is probably unwarranted. 
Those who regard the two Lucan texts I have considered as proof texts 
will, no doubt, tell me that I am presenting a rather unedifying spectacle: 
twisting and turning, impale<;l on intransigent texts, flailing about, search-
ing in vain for some way off the scriptural mount I am fixed on. Well, I 
have to admit that I wish these texts were not worded quite as they are. But 
I have questions I can ask them in return. Can they do any better with the 
dust of Genesis? With Paul's repeated representation of death as "sleep"? I 
do not regard these texts as proof texts-although I can't resist the tempta-
tion to point out that if J did, my proof texts would be much more numer-
ous, uniform, and straightforward than theirs. 
Drawing theological conclusions from Scripture is a complicated matter, 
just as drawing scientific conclusions from Nature is a complicated matter. 
In fact one can hardly ever draw conclusions from either-not, at any rate, 
highly abstract and theoretical conclusions. What one should do if one's 
interests are highly abstract and theoretical is to formulate abstract and the-
oretical positions (theological or scientific, as the case may be) and to see 
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what sense they make of the data (the words of Scripture or the phenome-
na of Nature). I think that, all in all, what the Bible says about death and 
resurrection makes more sense if we assume that death is but a sleep. T 
regard the two proof texts I have examined as recalcitrant data. (It is, of 
course, quite common in science for the best available theories to confront 
various recalcitrant data.) 
There is one New Testament datum that Platonic dualism does rather 
poorly with that I have not yet mentioned: the New Testament treats death 
as something horrible. In a famous essay 6, Oscar Cullmann has eloquently 
contrasted the death of Socrates and the death of Jesus. We are so familiar 
with both stories that the contrast between them may escape our notice till 
someone points it out to us. Although it is true that the judicial murder of 
Jesus was considerably more brutal than the judicial murder of Socrates, I 
do not see how we can possibly attribute the striking contrast between the 
agony in Gethsemane and the calm, measured discourse of Socrates in 
Crito and Phaedo to that fact alone.7 In my view, in the death of Jesus we see 
a man facing death who understood death (we see an absolutely perfect 
man facing death 011 his own, without the illusions about death that com-
forted Socrates and without the presence of the Holy Spirit, Who comforts 
Christian martyrs). Socrates' illusion was this: that it was not he who would 
die but simply an adjunct, his body-a thing that was not only not himself, 
but a prison, a coil to be shuffled off with relief. Jesus, however, knew that 
it was he himself, and not another thing, who would die, who would 
become a corpse, who would be composed of non-living matter. Therein 
lies the suffocating horror of death. At least this seems very real to me. 
When I think of the fact that I shall one day be composed of dead flesh, it is 
then that I appreciate the full power of the words of the medieval song: 
Timor mortis conturbat me. This is, by the bye, a very different experience 
from fearing nonexistence. It may be that the anticipation of endless nonex-
istence is frightening, but I find the anticipation of being even temporarily 
composed of dead flesh frightening. I am, after all, an animal, and this 
prospect is the prospect of a total violation of my animal nature.S 
LV 
An important philosophical argument for dualism remains to be 
addressed, an argument that, unlike the argument we examined in Part I, 
proceeds from Christian premises. This argument perhaps represents the 
primary philosophical reason that most Christian dualists would adduce for 
their position. In a nutshell, it is this: the doctrine of the Resurrection of the 
Dead presupposes dualism. For if I am not something immaterial, if I am a 
living animal, then death must be the end of me. If I am a living animal, then 
I am a material object. If I am a material object, then I am the mereological 
sum of certain atoms. But if I am the mereological sum of certain atoms 
today, it is clear from what we know about the metabolisms of living things 
that I was not the sum of those same atoms a year ago. Plainly I must have 
been the mereological sum of a different set of atoms a year ago-one that 
hardly overlaps the set of atoms whose mereological sum I am today." And 
the fact that the atoms of which I am composed are in continuous flux is a 
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stumbling block for the materialist who believes in resurrection. 
Suppose that a thousand years from now it is Time and God brings the 
present order of things to an end and inaugurates the new age. But how 
shall even omnipotence bring me back-me, whose former atoms are now 
spread pretty evenly throughout the biosphere? This question does not 
confront the dualist, who will say that there is no need to bring me back 
because I have never left. But what shall the materialist say? From the 
point of view of the materialist, it looks as if asking God to bring me back is 
like asking Him to bring back the snows of yesteryear or the light of other 
days. For what can even omnipotence do but reassemble? What else is there 
to do? And reassembly is not enough, for I have been composed of differ-
ent atoms at different times. If someone says, "If, in a thousand years, God 
reassembles the atoms that are going to compose you at the moment of 
your death, those reassembled atoms will compose you," there is an obvi-
ous objection to his thesis. If God can, a thousand years from now, 
reassemble the atoms that are going to compose me at the moment of my 
death-and no doubt He can-, He can also reassemble the atoms that 
compose me right now. In fact, if there is no overlap between the two sets 
of atoms, He could do both, and set the two resulting persons side by side. 
And which would be I? Neither or both, it would seem, and, since not 
both, neither. 
"God wouldn't do that." I dare say He wouldn't. But if He were to 
reassemble either set of atoms, the resulting man would be who he was, 
and it is absurd, it is utterly incoherent, to suppose that his identity could 
depend on what might happen to some atoms other than the atoms that 
compose him. In the end, there would seem to be no way round the fol-
lowing requirement: if I am a material thing, then, if a man who lives at 
some time in the future is to be I, there will have to be some sort of materi-
al and causal continuity between this matter that composes me now and 
the matter that will then compose that man. But this requirement looks 
very much like what Paul gives us in his description of the resurrection: 
when I die, the power of God will somehow preserve something of my 
present being, a gum nos k6kkos, which will continue to exist throughout the 
interval between my death and my resurrection and will, at the general 
resurrection, be clothed in a festal garment of new flesh. 
v 
I have asked the question, What can be said about whether a Christian is 
committed to dualism? I think that the answer must be that the Christian is 
not committed to dualism-not simply in virtue of being a Christian. I 
would not want to defend any stronger thesis than the following: it is per-
missible for a Christian to believe, it is a possible point of view for a 
Christian to adopt, that dualism represents a false picture of human nature 
(a picture that became a part of the world view of most Christians because 
Greek metaphysics pervaded the culture in which the young Church devel-
oped). Indeed, it seems to me to be ludicrous to suppose that any stronger 
thesis than this could be right. However good the arguments against dual-
ism may seem to me to be, I have to admit that God has allowed dualism to 
'. 
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become the dominant view of human nature among Christians. An essen-
tial part of my own contrary view of human nature and the afterlife-that 
U death is but a sleep" -was condemned at Trent, but no ecumenical council 
or denominational synod or inquisitorial office or faculty of theology, no 
Pope or archbishop or reformer, has, to my knowledge, condemned dual-
ism per se (I believe that some forms of dualism have been condemned by 
Rome). Since God has allowed dualism to dominate Christian anthropology 
for two millennia, 1 can only conclude that if dualism represents, as 1 
believe, a false view of our nature, this view is not perniciously false: a 
widespread acceptance of dualism does not distort or impoverish the 
Gospel. (I must make an important distinction. 1 do believe that there is an 
inherent tendency in dualism to distort some aspects of the Gospel. But 1 
should be foolish indeed if 1 argued that the same was not true of the thesis 
that we are breathing dust and death a sleep. It is not an unfamiliar situa-
tion in theology for all of the possible answers to a certain question to be 
dangerous. Christian theology is almost by definition a dangerous enter-
prise.) What I would have you believe is that dualism and materialism are 
like the various incompatible theories of Atonement: what one believes 
about dualism and materialism is a matter of Christian liberty: Christians 
may, in fear and trembling, make up their own minds about whether to be 
dualists or materialists-or if they are able (but this ability is a gift that is not 
often given to philosophers and theologians) simply to accept the scriptural 
statement that we are made in God's image and likeness and simply to 
accept the Gospel promise of eternal life and not to concern themselves with 
metaphysical questions about human nature and eternal life. 10 
The Unil'l'rsity of Notre Dame 
NOTES 
1. The friends of dualism may also want to point out that although the 
soul is not mentioned in creedal statements about eschatology, the soul is men-
tioned in the part of the Athanasian Creed devoted to the human nature of 
Christ: 
... and perfect Man, of a reasonable soul [animll rationabilis] and human 
flesh subsisting. 
The human soul also figures in an analogy that is supposed to clarify the 
nature of the union of the divine and human natures in Christ: 
... for as the reasonable soul and flesh is one man, so God and man is one 
Christ. 
But it is not clear to me that the phrases 'of a reasonable soul and human 
flesh subsisting' and 'as the reasonable soul and flesh is one man' must be 
understood as a Christian Platonist would understand them; it seems to me 
that an Aristotelian interpretation is also possible. We should remember that 
Augustine (whose spirit is present throughout the Athanasian Creed) attempt-
ed to illumine the nature of the Trinity by comparing the Father, the Son, and 
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the Holy Spirit with the psychological operations of intellect, understanding, 
and will. But no one would take this as evidence that Augustine believed that 
Socrates' intellect, Socrates' understanding, and Socrates' will were in any 
sense three separate (or separable) existences. 
2. Cf. II Cor 5. 
3. I would agree with Augustine [De Civ. Dei, XIII, 20] that when Paul 
says that we shall receive a "pneumatic soma" or "spiritual body," he does not 
mean that the visible, tangible flesh we have now will be transformed into or 
replaced by invisible, intangible flesh; he means, rather, that we shall be given 
visible, tangible flesh that is perfectly subject to spirit, to the intellect and will 
that have been perfected in Christ. (When Paul has a spiritual body, he will no 
longer have to say, "1 see in my members a different law. .. .") Augustine 
offers an analogy: Just as we call a spirit "carnal" when it is subject to the flesh, 
so we may call a body "spiritual" when it is subject to the spirit. 
4. The wording of the parallel passage in Luke (9:24) is worth taking note 
of: "For what will someone be profited if he gains the whole world but loses or 
forfeits himself." 
5. As far as purely grammatical considerations go, it would not be impos-
sible to translate this as "Truly I tell you today, you shall be with me in Par-
adise"; I have to admit, however, that it does not seem at all likely that this was 
the meaning Luke intended. 
6. "Immortality of the Soul or Resurrection of the Dead?" in Immortality 
and Resurrection, Krister Stendahl, ed., (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1965), 
pp.9-54. 
7. The suggestion of Harry A. Wolfson ("Immortality and Resurrection in 
the Philosophy of the Church Fathers," in the volume cited in the previous 
note) that the agony of Jesus is to be attributed to Jesus' awareness that he was 
a sinner who must face judgment simply has no basis whatever in the text of 
the New Testament. 
8. I of course believe, as a Christian, that death is a defeated enemy. Well, 
Hitler's Germany was a defeated enemy in 1944: its final destruction was then 
inevitable and assured. But it was still frightening and it still had terrible things 
to do. 
9. I am assuming various metaphysical theses here-that it is possible for 
one and the same thing to be the mereological sum of different things at differ-
ent times; that it is not possible for any things to have more than one mereolog-
ical sum at a given time; that human beings like me can strictly and literally 
endure through time; and many others. There are a lot of such assumptions. I 
could write a book. 
10. When this paper was read at the Notre Dame conference on the philos-
ophy of mind for which it was written, Dean Zimmerman was the commenta-
tor. I wish to thank him for his thought-provoking and insightful comments. 
The paper was also read at a Pacific regional meeting of the Society of 
Christian Philosophers. The members of the audiences on both occasions-and 
particularly William Hasker and Daniel Howard-Synder- are thanked for 
their questions and comments. 
